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I. INTRODUCTION
The information infrastructure has significant implications for the gover-
nance of an information society. Despite the popular perception, the global
information infrastructure ("GI") is not a lawless place. Rather, it poses a
fundamental challenge for effective leadership and governance. Laws, regu-
lations, and standards can, do, and will affect infrastructure development
and the behavior of GII participants. Rules and rule-making do exist. How-
ever, the identities of the rule-makers and the instruments used to establish
rules will not conform to classic patterns of regulation.
The global network environment defies traditional regulatory theories and
policymaking practices. At present, policymakers and private sector orga-
nizations are searching for appropriate regulatory strategies to encourage
and channel the GI. 1 Most attempts to define new rules for the develop-
ment of the GIl rely on disintegrating concepts of territory and sector, while
ignoring the new network and technological borders that transcend national
boundaries.' The Gil creates new models and sources for rules. Policy lead-
ership requires a fresh approach to the governance of global networks. In-
stead of foundering on old concepts, the Gil requires a new paradigm for
governance that recognizes the complexity of networks, builds constructive
relationships among the various participants (including governments, sys-
tems operators, information providers, and citizens), and promotes incen-
tives for the attainment of various public policy objectives in the private
sector.
See, e.g., Chair's Conclusions, G-7 Ministerial Conference on the Information Society, Brussels
(Feb. 25-26, 1995) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/g7/keydocs/G7en.html>.
2 See., e.g., INFO. INFRAsRucTRE TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND "m NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995) (<http://www.uspto.gov
/niiip.html>) [hereinafter NIl WHrrE PAPER]. Various equivalent foreign reports from Canada, the Europe-
an Union, and Japan tend to focus similarly on changes to national laws and the applicability in specified
territories of 'information society" rights. See, e.g., <http://www.ic.gc.calic-datalinfo-highway/general
/report.april94.e.txt> (Canadian report); <http://www2.echo.lulother/national.html> (EU country reports);
<http://www.mpt.go.jp/Report/unofficial.html> (unofficial translation of Japanese report with references
only to national monopolies).
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I. THE DISINTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGMS
Global communications networks challenge the way economic and social
interactions are regulated. In the past, legal rules usually governed behavior
in distinct subject areas for defined territories. These national and substan-
tive borders formed the sovereignty paradigms for regulatory authority and
decision-making. For example, intellectual property rights and privacy
rights--each critical for the ordering of an information society-have been
designed as distinct bodies of law. Copyright, patent, trademark, and trade
secret law protect specific attributes of information and its economic value,
while privacy law guards specific information about individuals from par-
ticular harms. Customarily, such distinct rules applied only in the rule-
maker's geographically defined territory.' Few "transnational rights" in the
economic and social sphere truly exist; international treaties and regional
obligations typically establish some degree of harmonized, national stan-
dards instead of a single, unique "global" right.4 With the GIl, however,
territorial borders and substantive borders disintegrate as key paradigms for
regulatory governance.
A. Permeable National Borders
For centuries, regulatory authority derived from the physical proximity of
political, social, and economic communities. International law grants legiti-
macy to a governing authority if it exercises sovereignty over a physical ter-
ritory and its people.' Constitutional governance predicates sovereignty on
the existence of geographically distinct political and social units.6
' See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last re-
vised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised, July 1, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; ROBERT A. GORMAN
& JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINE= 873-901 (4th ed., 1993).
' See, e.g., Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (<http://iti.irv.uit.no/trade-law/documents/freetradelwta-94/art/ii.htn-l>). Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guide-
lines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Oct. 1, 1980, 20
I.L.M. 422; Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 LL.M. 317 (<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/enldataprot
/counceur/conv.html>).
See REsATEMENT (rIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
6 See, eg., U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX. Even in nondemocratic states, sovereignty was internally
equated with distinct territorial borders. See JOHN N. HAZARD Er AL, THE SoviET LEGAL SYSTEM THE
LAw IN THE 1980s 14-17, 25-29 (1984).
1996]
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Regulatory power has always been defined in terms of national borders.
Key rights establishing the structure of an information society, such as intel-
lectual property protections, fair information practice standards, and compe-
tition rules, are all territorially based.7 The adjudication of disputes also
typically depends on territorially-empowered courts. Similarly, police pow-
ers to enforce regulatory policies and decisions through property seizures or
incarceration are territorially restricted.
Transnational information flows on the GII undermine these foundational
borders and erode state sovereignty over regulatory policy and enforcement.
Geographic limits have diminishing value. Physical borders become trans-
parent and foreign legal systems have local relevance. Network activities
may make participants subject to legal rules of distant jurisdictions. Political
and economic communities based predominantly on geographic proximity
and physical contact have less relevance in cyberspace because network
communities can replace physically proximate communities. Political dis-
course can ignore national borders, while affinities and affiliations transcend
distances and human contact. Internet "listservs 's and "usenet groups"9 in-
volve participants from around the world communicating directly with each
other on topics of mutual interest. Economic relationships need no physical
situs. With electronic cash and new means of electronic stored value, such
as those developed by Cybercash and Mondex, Internet transactions may
take place entirely on the network without the physical delivery of goods or
services and without resort to any national payment system. Even social
relationships now evolve in the absence of physical contact. On-line chat
rooms provide live, but remote, contact, and cybersex offers the very inti-
mate, albeit electronic, relationships. "
See, e.g., PAUL B. STipHAN III Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND
PoucY 397-405, 420-21 (1993).
' A listserv is a fiaure of electronic mail software that automatically distributes messages to sub-
scribers of a specified list To participate, a computer user sends a subscription message to the host com-
puter. Once the host computer accepts the subscriber, the person may post messages to all participants on
the list by sending a single e-mail to the host. Depending on the type of list, each single, incoming mes-
sage may automatically be copied to all members on the list, whether the list has 10 or 10,000 members,
or may be copied to all members on the list only after screening by a list moderator.
' Usenet groups allow computer users to post messages on a bulletin board at a host site. Access to
the bulletin board is unrestricted.
0 For an illustrative experience, adult-oriented chat rooms may be found on the Internet at
<http://chat.bianca.com/cgi-binldisplaychatshack/quickref.html>. See also Anastasia Toufexis, Romancing
the Computer, TIME, Feb. 19, 1996, at 53 (reporting on cyber-romances and the filing of a divorce petition
in New Jersey because of a spouse's alleged "on-line" affair).
[Vol. 45
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The permeability of national borders destabilizes territorial rights. Inevita-
bly, differences will exist among various key national rights in an informa-
tion society. The scope, for instance, of intellectual property rights is not
uniform across state lines." Even the mechanisms by which countries may
assure rights such as privacy may vary significantly. 2 Yet the GIl creates
simultaneous "global" rightholders. A given activity may be subject to dif-
fering rights at the same time, such as trademark or antitrust protections, be-
cause the activity transcends the borders of any single nation. This by itself
imposes conflict. In addition, the temptations to apply national laws and
standards extraterritorially further compound the legal uncertainty. The pat-
ent law of the United States, for example, has extended to restrict foreign
activities that were legal where conducted, while the new data protection
directive of the European Union requires the evaluation of foreign data
processing standards." Nevertheless, the erosion of national borders places
an important degree of network activity beyond the physical grasp of state
authorities, although states may still force individuals or corporations within
their borders to behave in particular ways. This enforcement problem chal-
lenges the uniformity of any right.
B. Ambiguous Substantive Borders
Beyond the disintegration of territorial borders, the GIl also undermines
substantive legal sovereignty. Governance has relied historically on clear
distinctions and borders in substantive law. For example, telecommunica-
tions law has been distinct from financial services law, and intellectual
property law has been distinct from privacy law. Similarly, the borders of
protection within any particular field were usually well defined. A "com-
mon carrier" had a set of regulations quite apart from those of a "cable"
provider 5 or broadcaster.
" See, e.g., Symposium, Fordham Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Poli-
cy, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.1 1 (1993).
2 See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Finan-
cial Services, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. S 137 (1992); Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and
Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1994) (extending the scope of U.S. process patent protection to prevent
the importation of legally manufactured foreign products).
" See Directive 95/46 of the Eur. Parliament and of the Council, arts. 25-26, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31,
45-46 [hereinafter Privacy Directive].
1$ See ROBERT R. BRUCE Er AL., FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC SERvICEs 153-68
(1986).
19961
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The GII obscures these substantive boundaries; critical substantive rights
become muddled. The new technological abilities of a telephone company
to offer "video" dial tone and a cable company to propose voice communi-
cations undercut the well-defined borders of communications law. The digi-
tal environment challenges the applicability of basic information society
rights, such as copyright, as well as the boundaries among other intellectual
property rights. Designers of information products can, to a certain extent,
package their works to pick and choose legal protection. Processing instruc-
tions can, for example, be embedded in a semiconductor chip to benefit
from sui generis legal protection, 6 stored on a floppy disk to be covered
under copyright," or incorporated in a device to obtain patent protec-
tion." This substantive blurring of rights creates significant uncertainty;
the degree and scope of protection become variable.
In addition, network interactions defy clear disciplinary categorization.
The regulation of an information transfer or transaction can easily cross
sectoral lines. For example, a packet of information may contain electronic
cash or payment instructions, along with digitally reconstructed images of
an individual. In such a case, the legal interests cross many sectoral lines,
including telecommunications, financial services, intellectual property, and
privacy. Even pure information processing activity may cross sectoral lines.
For example, a third party may process transaction information for a retail
chain that includes netting of payments. In one sense, this activity is unreg-
ulated information processing; yet in another sense it is a banking activity
and might be subject to bank safety and soundness requirements.
More significantly, digitalization and the information infrastructure enable
the objectives of one distinct body of law, such as privacy, to be achieved
by application of the rules of another field of law, such as intellectual prop-
erty. Secondary use of personal data, for example, is a core issue for infor-
mation privacy law, but in the multimedia context, copyright law can also
regulate the manipulation of data relating to individuals.' 9 In essence, func-
tional activity is more relevant than sectoral legal boundaries.
16 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994).
, See §§ 101-102, 106, 117.
n See 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (1994).
'9 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Multimedia as a New Challenge and Opportunity In Privacy: The Ex-
amples of Sound and Image Processing, 22 Materialien zum Datenschutz 9 (1995).
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF NETWORK SOVEREIGNTY
Just as traditional foundations for governance are breaking down, new
boundaries are emerging on the GIL, The infrastructure itself contains visi-
ble borders. Network borders replace national borders. Network service pro-
viders, as well as the infrastructure architecture, each establish rules of par-
ticipation for defined network areas. These rules form visible borders on the
GII. In addition to these visible borders, network communities also develop
distinct sovereign powers. Thus, infrastructure organizations acquire attrib-
utes of the traditional territorial sovereigns.
A. Visible Network Borders
The demarcation lines among network service providers such as America
OnLine, CompuServe, EUNet, or Prodigy create important boundaries. Pri-
vate contractual arrangements determine the availability and the conditions
of access for network connections. These contractual arrangements define
distinct borders among various service providers. Participants on the GII
will be subject to different contractual rules, benefit from different resourc-
es, and adhere to different pricing plans, according to network service
agreements." In essence, the reach of a service provider's network estab-
lishes an important boundary line in an information society.
Network architecture also creates a significant type of border. System
design imposes rules of order on an information society. Technical choices
are policy decisions that have inherent consequences for network partici-
pants. For example, integrated services digital network (ISDN) technology
and the World Wide Web transmission protocol offer superior interactive
capabilities and choices when compared to analog technology and simple
file transfer protocols. Gateways between different systems or between a
proprietary network like America OnLine and the Internet establish funda-
mental rules of conduct; without a gateway, interactions are effectively
prohibited. In effect, technical standards exert substantial control over infor-
mation flows. 1 The degree of system interoperability thus determines the
=' See Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in
Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JuuIErcs 1. 1 (1994) (arguing for model con-
tracts).
21 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JUEar-Mcs J. 311, 322 (1995) (argu-
ing for technical self-help as an alternative to model contracts).
19961
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openness of the information society and determines whether network archi-
tectural "borders" can be crossed.
Technical standards set default boundary rules in the network that tend to
empower selected participants. For example, transmission protocols can
embed rules of control on the use of personal information collected by the
network. World Wide Web browsers such as Netscape record transaction
data on Internet users' hard drives and make the information available to
host sites.' The JavaScript in Netscape similarly allows Web sites to col-
lect real-time data on visitors' activities and to examine the directory of a
visitor's hard drive.' These designs set as a default rule the empowerment
of Web sites. Yet, at least in the case of Netscape, the software allows sav-
vy users to override the recording feature.24 Other protocols tend to enable
producer choice in the use of intellectual property.' For example, copy
protection techniques for digital audio tapes assist producers to control the
reproduction of perfect digital copies.' Electronic rights management pro-
tocols are emerging to enable on-line protection of intellectual property.27
These visible network borders arise from complex rule-making processes.
Technical standardization may be the result of a purely market-driven pro-
cess or alternatively may be adopted through a standards body. The classic
example of a market-promulgated standard is the QWERTY keyboard. Once
the now famous keyboard configuration became popular, public acceptance
' Netscape creates a log file (usually named <cookies.txt>) in the program directory that allows
Web sites to record the pages viewed by the user. The Web site may access this data from the user's per-
sonal computer when the user revisits the site. See Cookies Technical Specifications <http://home.
netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html>.
' See John Robert LoVerso, Netscape Navigator 2.0 Exposes User's Browsing History, RISKS DI-
GST, Feb. 23, 1996 <http://catless.ncl.ac.ukIRisksl7.79html> (describing bug that allows collection of
real-time data); John Robert LoVerso, Report of Netscape 2.01 JavaScript Problems <http://www.osf.org
/-Iloverso/javascriptlwww-see-Mar22.html> (describing ability to browse a user's directory).
4 Users concerned about their privacy may disable the feature by changing the attributes of the
<cookies.txt> file to a read-only file.
' See e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Microsoft Backs Ratings System for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1996, at D1.
26 See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of Lock Out" Programs, 68 So. CAL L. REV. 1091 (1995); Pamela Samuelson,
Technological Protection for Copyrighted Works, Paper presented at the Randolph W. Thrower Sympo-
sium on Legal Issues in Cyberspace at Emory Law School (Feb. 22, 1996) (on file with the author).
1 See U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVA-
CY IN NETWORK ENVIR.ONMENTS 110 (1994) [hereinafter INFORMATION SECuTrrY]; Interactive Media
Ass'n, IP Requirements Forum: Electronic Commerce for Content <bttp://www.ima.org/fomms/ip/ip_
meet.html>.
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of other, more user-friendly configurations was unlikely. In contrast, stan-
dards bodies seek to identify and recommend technical specifications for
particular network needs such as security. Standards bodies range from
industry groups to combined industry/government organizations. These
organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and the International Organization for Standards (ISO), play a critical role
in the development and promotion of technical standards. In essence, these
organizations assure and reinforce the contours of network borders.
B. Powerful Network Communities
In addition to the new "geography" of borders, networks may now even
supplant substantive, national regulation with their own rules of citizenship
and participation.' Networks themselves take on political characteristics as
self-governing entities. Networks determine the rules and conditions of
membership. Private contracts mediate the rights and responsibilities of
participants.29 Service providers offer different terms of adherence. Ameri-
ca OnLine and Prodigy, for example, have varying policies on user priva-
cy, 0 while Counsel Connect's message-posting rules for lawyers differ
from those for law students. 1 Discussion groups on the Internet have their
own rules of access and participation. Usenet groups are open to all, while
listserv groups are available only to subscribers authorized by the list owner
according to some criteria, such as knowledge of a particular field, although
a list owner may open the list to anyone without restriction.
Networks also determine the rules of participant behavior. This character-
istic can result in rules that reverse established territorial laws. For example,
by means of private contract with network participants, Counsel Connect re-
versed, in effect, the traditional copyright allocation of rights of authorship
for bulletin board message postings.32 Alternatively, network conduct rules
23 See David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 49 STAN.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
2 Networks have the rule-making capability of private associations. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Prop-
er Legal Regime for "Cyberspaceo " 55 U. PUT. L. REV. 993, 1028-32 (1994).
3 Compare "Prodigy Service Agreement" §§ 6-7 with "America Online's 'Rules of the Road'
§ 7c (<www.cdtorg/privacy/oline services/chart.html>).
31 For example, the Law Schools Online service allows law students to "listen in on one of LCC's
350 discussion groups as practicing lawyers, judges and law professors discuss law as it's really prac-
ticed." Lexis-Nexis Law Schools Online, version Win 3.1 (1996).
31 See Hardy, supra note 29, at 1031.
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may be sui generis. Microsoft, for example, is endorsing a ratings system
for information distributed on the World Wide Web to allow voluntary
screening of material inappropriate for children.3 In contrast, CompuServe
and Netcom each initially chose to exclude all participants worldwide from
various Internet discussion groups because of an inquiry by a German pro-
vincial state prosecutor into the availability of pornographic content and the
fear of potential criminal liability. These on-line services could have tai-
lored more narrowly the restrictions, if in fact they would have incurred
German liability for use of their networks within Germany. For the nonpro-
prietary Internet, an entire body of customary rules of behavior has even
been formulated as "netiquette.
' 34
Like nation-states, network communities have significant powers to en-
force rules of participant conduct. In the case of proprietary networks such
as America OnLine or CompuServe, service providers may terminate access
for offending participants. Netiquette rules for the Internet may even be
enforced through the use of technologies by individual members of the
network community. For example, the Internet has the equivalent of self-
appointed policemen and policymakers. "Spamming," the sending of unso-
licited messages, results in "cancelbots," programs that delete messages
circulating on the Internet from offending senders. Even the Guardian An-
gels have begun to patrol the Net with their "CyberAngels" to look for
crime and safety problem areas.35 Similarly, "technologies of justice" will
regulate and enforce behavioral standards or expectations.36 For example,
software developers have created filters for the World Wide Web protocol
to allow network participants to mask commercial advertisements while
viewing Web sites. Even collective efforts in adjudication of disputes are
likewise emerging in the network community. There is at least one mecha-
nism, the Virtual Magistrate, for on-line dispute settlement with network-
based tribunals of experts.37
" See Lewis, supra note 25, at DI.
" An Internet guide to netiquette is available at <ftp://ds.intemic.net/rfc/rfc1855.txt>.
3 See <http://proxis.com/-safetyed/cyberangelseyberangelsO5.html>.
3' See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996).
" The Virtual Magistrate Project was launched in March 1996 to "assist in the rapid, initial resolu-
tion of computer network disputes" by a pool of on-line neutral arbitrators. The project is based on the
Internet at <http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/>. The National Center for Automated Information Research, a
prominent nonprofit foundation, is similarly supporting work exploring on-line dispute mediation and held
an invitational meeting, "The On-Line Dispute Resolution Conference," in May 1996.
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IV. THE INCONGRUITY OF TRADITIONAL REGULATORY
POLICYMAKING
When faced with these new dimensions of network governance, existing
regulatory approaches are incongruous and ill-situated to resolve the chal-
lenges of the network environment. Despite the fundamental impact of the
GII on governance, U.S. regulation and the American policy decision-mak-
ing process remain wedded to the traditional paradigms of distinct legal
fields and territorial borders. The U.S. approach to regulation and its philo-
sophical preference for narrowly targeted law obscure the dramatic evolu-
tion of the information society. At the same time, European regulation simi-
larly anchors rules in territorial and substantive jurisdictional areas, although
it tends to favor proactive government intervention. These differing ap-
proaches offer a contrasting set of difficulties arising from the problems
governments have in coping with the speed and magnitude of change in this
area.
A. Obscured Vision
The U.S. approach to regulatory policy gives decision-makers an ob-
scured vision of the new structural boundaries on the GII. The American
legal tradition eschews a powerful state role in society and draws on a
deep-seated philosophy of limited government. 8  The constitutional
structure itself, by emphasizing a citizen's rights against the state, expresses
a commitment to limits on state power. Even in the wake of increases in
government regulation following the New Deal and Progressive Eras, U.S.
law-making rhetoric remained hostile toward the regulation of industry.39
Whether the boundary is between the federal and state governments or be-
tween legal disciplines, legal standards evolve primarily in response to dis-
crete identified problems or crises, and jurisdictional lines are vitally impor-
tant.
In the area of information policy, the U.S. approach has a distinct prefer-
ence for self-regulation in the private sector. For example, important fair
38 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sec-
tor, 80 IOWA L. REv. 497 (1995).
3' See Morton L Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1426 (1982).
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information praclice standards are not typically found in legislation, but
rather are determined by company activities." Legal rules tend to be nar-
rowly drawn, as for example, the strong protections for video rental re-
cords4c ' and the scant protections for health care records, 2 or they purport
to seek only minor adjustments to existing regimes, such as the National
Information Infrastructure Task Force work on intellectual property
rights. 43 Over the last decade, intellectual property laws and information
privacy rules have evolved only modestly, as compared to the dramatic evo-
lution of information technology. Perhaps the most significant legal re-
sponse to the GII thus far has been the arduous process of telecommuni-
cations reform.' Despite the de facto restructuring of communications in-
dustries, fragmented policymaking in Congress had extraordinary difficulty
dealing with the complexity of both the change in information technology
and special interests. The resulting law is a striking display of well-funded
special interest klbbying.45 Congress did not even try to deal with many of
the intertwined issues of privacy and intellectual property.
The consequence of the U.S. approach is that policymaking for global
information flows is widely dispersed and ill equipped to face the gover-
nance challenges.' Under the U.S. system, no single government organiza-
tion is in a position to assess the redefinitions of traditional regulatory bor-
ders. Multiple federal agencies, including the State Department, the United
States Trade Representative, the Federal Communications Commission, the
Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, and the National Institute for Standards and Technology,
each have narrow and overlapping claims to various discrete aspects of
information policy. Regulators then compete with one another for jurisdic-
tional power. The National Telecommunications and Information Adminis-
tration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Communications
' See Reidenberg, supra note 38, at 508-11.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
42 See Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295
(1995).
See NU WHrrE PAPER., supra note 2. However, these adjustments are not truly "minor."
" This two-year process resulted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N., I10 Stat. 56.
4S See id.; Telecom Bill Rated One of Top Sweetheart Deals in 1995, WAsH. TELEcoM. NEwS, Jan.
8, 1996.
46 See e.g., THE NEW DiFORMATION INFASTRUCrURE: STRATEOmS FOR U.S. PoulcY (William J.
Drake ed., 1995).
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Commission have each, for example, tried to stake out claims to privacy is-
sues.47 The significance of the paradigmatic shift in borders becomes lost
in the bureaucratic maze. For example, government agencies do not general-
ly have the combination of technical skills and public policy mandates to
examine the impact of choices in technological standards on regulatory
policy or objectives. No agency has a complete perspective on the structural
changes taking place in society as a result of the GIl. Even the Clinton
Administration's present effort to develop a vision for the information infra-
structure and its governance through the work of the Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force (IlTF) remains captive to sectoral thinking and reactive
tendencies. The study groups are divided along sectoral lines and some of
the most time-consuming projects, like privacy and intellectual property,
remain focused on territorial borders and the transposition of status quo
interests to cyberspace. In addition, the subcommittee groups compete with
one another for recognition. For privacy alone, the U.S. Advisory Council
(expert advisors to the IlTF), the Working Group on Privacy, the Govern-
ment Services Group, and the Security Issues Forum have each issued sepa-
rate policy statements.
Although the Gil has its origins in the United States, the U.S. regulatory
policy process is beginning to appear as a serious impediment to effective
leadership. The incongruity of American regulatory practices with the GIl's
multidisciplinary character and rapid technological pace seems to enshrine
significant inefficiency and narrowness in the development of Gil policies.
The United States can no longer assume that its legal and policy standards
will dominate the GIl merely by the strength of the American market. In the
case of information privacy, the European Union has already set the global
agenda with its 1995 data protection directive. The United States, like other
countries, must develop new governance paradigms that encompass the
shifting borders of the GIl.
47 See. eg., U.S. DEmT. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY
AND THE NU1: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995); Calling
Number Identification Service-Caller ID, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,489 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§
64.1600-64.1604); Fed. Trade Comm'n Workshop: Consumer Protection and the Global Information Infra-
structure (Apr. 10-11, 1995) <http://www.fte.gov/opp/ii.htm>. The Federal Trade Commission also runs a
privacy discussion listserv on the Interet at <http://www.fte.gov/flc/privacy.htm>.
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B. Overloaded Vision
By contrast to the American experience, other regulators outside the Unit-
ed States confront the GH from comprehensive vantage points. In Europe,
unlike the United States, comprehensive government regulation is not anath-
ema to society.43 For example, European policymaking often comes from
centralized institutions, such as the independent "data protection agencies,"
which play an important role in the formulation of information policy, with
mandates that attach to information flows rather than narrow sectoral regu-
lations.49 Omnibus rules such as data protection legislation 0 and sui gene-
ris laws, such as relatively new intellectual property rights,5 present far-
reaching views on information policy rather than ad hoc solutions to narrow
problems. Central government agencies with comprehensive powers institu-
tionalize broad policy planning and issue debates. The European Union, for
example, has established an Information Society Project Office to coordi-
nate a number of wide-ranging European Commission activities. Yet at the
same time, an omnibus view cannot possibly address the full scope of is-
sues simultaneously confronting the GII. As an illustration of this crucial
problem, the European Commission had to narrow the range of issues ad-
dressed in its recent Green Paper on copyright. 2
Although the omnibus approach to regulation may offer a broader vision
for public policy in a global network environment than the U.S. approach,
the vision inherent in European efforts still tends to preserve important, yet
evaporating, foundations, based on territorial principles and subject matter
distinctions. National application remains pre-eminent. The principle of
"subsidiarity" in European Community law reflects this continued commit-
" See MARY Am, GLENDON, RIGHTS TALx: THE IMPOVERSHMENT OF POLrICAL DISCOURSE 1-17
(1991) (observing differences in the political culture of "rights" between the United States and European
societies).
49 See Privacy Directive, supra note 14, at arts. 1, 28.
' See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polls: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal
Data, 80 IOwA L. REv. 445 (1995).
"l See Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42 (requiring European Community member states to adopt a special set of rules for the copyright
protection of computer software). Previously, France, when faced with the problem of software protection,
added an essentially si generis protection into the French copyright law. See Loi No. 85-660, 1985
A.L.D. 357.
a See European Comm'n, Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Soci-
ety, reprinted in 43 J. CoPYRiGHT Soc'Y 50, 55 (1995) (noting that the Green Paper addresses only a
subset of intellectual property issues for the information society).
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ment to territorial and sectoral boundaries. 3 Under "subsidiarity," the Eu-
ropean Community may only act on matters that are not more properly
within the boundaries of member-state competence. When actions are taken
at the European level through "Directives," each European member state
must enact conforming national rights that implement the legal standards
defined in the relevant Directive; Directives do not in themselves create
supranational rights that can be invoked directly by citizens.
The broad approach also illustrates the problems of omnibus control. No
matter how an omnibus regulatory policy is decided, the extraterritorial
impact foreshadows difficulties. Under the European data protection rules,
for example, personal information may not be transferred outside the Euro-
pean Union unless adequate privacy protections exist at the destination.5'
The very omnibus character of European rules makes appropriate compari-
sons to other legal systems, like that of the United States, complex.5" Simi-
larly, reciprocity provisions in intellectual property rules offer disparate
treatment depending on the type of available foreign protections.
In the rapidly developing GII, the institutionalized vigilance for informa-
tion flows that follows from an omnibus approach risks becoming rigid. The
very process of adopting and implementing a European Directive is slow.
For example, the first draft of the data privacy directive was released in
1990, the final text was adopted in 1995, and member state implementation
need not be completed before 1998. By the time standards are implemented
in national legislation, certain rules may be obsolete due to the rapid pace
of technological development. Similarly, bureaucratic processes do not lend
themselves well to rapidly changing technologies. The information system
registration schemes common in some European countries over the last
twenty years frequently relied on concepts such as "data files." While this
made sense initially, techniques for the storage of personal information in
an age of distributed databases no longer associate data with particular iden-
tifiable locations.
' Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1 (Feb. 7, 1992). See GEORGE A.
BEuANN Er AL., CASES AND MATEIALS ON EUROPEAN CoMMUNrY LAW, 1995 Supp., 11-14 (1995);
George A. Bennann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the Unit-
ed States. 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994).
See Privacy Directive, supra note 14, at art. 25.
" See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED
STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996).
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Because the omnibus approach encourages extensive and customarily
slow deliberation, regulatory policies risk network circumvention. If partici-
pants structure their network activities to avoid a jurisdiction, the omnibus
approach makes a government response difficult and enforcement uncertain.
V. A NETWORK GOVERANCE PARADIGM
The development of a new model for governing networks is crucial for
effective policy leadership on the GIl. The new paradigm must recognize all
dimensions of network regulatory power. As a complex mix of rule-makers
emerges to replace the simple, state sovereign model, new policy instru-
ments must appear that are capable of establishing important norms of con-
duct for networks. Policymakers must begin to recognize network sover-
eignty and begin to shift the regulatory role of states toward indirect means
that develop network rules.
A. Complex Mix of Rule-Makers
On the GII, governance can no longer be viewed as an exercise in state
edict. The relationships among the different participants in the information
infrastructure become interactive. States have direct interests in the develop-
ment of an information society. The private sector has a crucial role in the
creation of the GII. Technologists have a pivotal position for policy choices
and the Gil empowers citizens to establish rules of their own. Policymaking
among these different interest centers is intertwined. For example, techno-
logical choices may frustrate or support state interests or citizen goals.
Overlapping jurisdiction and the rapid evolution of information technology
defy the traditionid forms of state control.
For global networks, governance should be seen as a complex mix of
state, business, technical, and citizen forces. Rules for network behavior
will come from each of these interest centers. Within this framework, the
private sector must be a driving force in the development of the information
society and governments must be involved to protect public interests. At the
same time, policyimaking cannot ignore technological concerns and tech-
nologically-driven decision-making.
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B. New Policy Instruments
The recognition of new network borders opens new instruments for the
achievement of regulatory objectives. Executive and legislative fora lose a
degree of relevance to technical standards organizations. Standards decisions
affect fundamental public concerns and are no longer technical rules of
purely commercial interest. Standards now contain significant policy rules.
The availability of "clickstream," or keystroke, data such as those contained
in the Netscape file <cookies.txt> is, for example, a default policy rule.56
The debate over encryption standards and key escrow mechanisms similarly
reflects the critical new instrumentality of standards-setting. s7
In the network governance paradigm, standards bodies will not be able to
avoid robust public policy debates. Already, the Canadian Standards Associ-
ation has tried to incorporate policy debate through the promulgation of a
privacy standard, s and other national government agencies are encourag-
ing technical decision-makers to implement policy objectives.5 9 This recog-
nition will change the process of making decisions at standards organiza-
tions. At present, citizen interests are either weakly or indirectly represented
in setting standards. For example, the American National Standards Institute
("ANSI") is an umbrella organization in the United States that has prepared
a framework for identifying requirements for national information infra-
structure standards.' The Information Infrastructure Standards Panel only
indirectly considers user needs through the standards developers and tech-
nology vendors.61 Governments can and should seek standards that facili-
tate or incorporate broader policy objectives. Without a widening of the
policy concerns inherent in technical standards, the results may be distorted.
For instance, standards of electronic rights management for intellectual
s See supra note 22.
See INFORMATION SECURniY, supra note 27, at 111-34; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. AS-
SESSMENT, ISSUES UPDATE ON INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN NETwORK ENVIRONMENTS 1-34
(1995); Joel R. Reidenberg & Frangoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in
the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 109 (1995).
38 See CANADIAN STANDARDS ASS'N, MODEL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFOR-
MATION (1996).
- See INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMM'R OF ONTARIO, CANADA & REGmTRATEKAMER OF THE
NEHERLANDS, PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGImS: Ti PATE TO ANONYMITY (1995).
' See ANSI, Framework for Identifying Requirements for Standards for the National Information
Infrastructure, Apr. 11, 1995 (visited Mar. 15, 1996) <-http.//www.ansi.org/iisp/fiam4nii.htmrl>.
61 Id. 1.
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property may transgress policy goals for fair information practices if the
technical decisions do not consider the privacy implications. The Canadian
experience and growing government interest in technologies of privacy,
including encryption, are beginning to force this broader consideration at
standards bodies.
Nevertheless, the practicality and consequence of embedding regulatory
policy in technical standards pose a number of important dilemmas. If tech-
nical systems implement policy decisions through particular standards, de-
sirable policy changes might necessitate rebuilding the infrastructure. Some
policy objectives might also be more readily incorporated into standards
than others. For example, the basic data protection principle that personal
information not be retained any longer than necessary to accomplish the
purpose for which it was collected may easily translate into a standard for
data purging, but the principle that data may only be used for the purpose
for which it was collected is far more difficult to build into the system,
because data may be reused and recycled.
C. Network Federalism
Governance in the network environment suggests a need to recognize
network systems as semi-sovereign entities." Networks have key attributes
of sovereignty: participant/citizens via service provider membership agree-
ments, "constitutional" rights through contractual terms of service, and po-
lice powers through taxation (fees) and system operator sanctions. In effect,
network users become stakeholders in transnational political and economic
communities. As CompuServe's elimination of certain Internet usenet
groups illustrates, network management affects participant discourse.'
These characteristics warrant a degree of network independence from state
intervention.
Nevertheless, where networks develop parallel to physical society, tradi-
tional governments retain crucial public responsibilities and significant in-
terests. For example, distance learning through video conferencing may
substitute for local schools, but it does not diminish or replace the public
interest in an educated citizenry. Similarly, physical points of contact be-
6 See, eg., Johnson & Post, supra note 28 (arguing that cyberspace should be recognized as its own
jurisdiction).
' See text accompanying notes 33-34.
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tween networks and states as a result of the location of users, as well as the
location of network infrastructure (such as cables and nodes), give states a
direct interest in network activities.
The overlap of interests between the physical world and the virtual world
suggests a governance model that contains distinct rules for the separation
of powers. Territorial borders will retain an important role in structuring
overlaps between network boundaries and state jurisdictions. Principles of
federalism offer a valuable lesson for the relationship between territorial
governments and cyberspace. Just as Lex Mercatoria did not displace the
law of the situs of trade fairs,' a new Lex Informatica suggests that sover-
eign states should act only within particular spheres or zones of influ-
ence.6' State governments can and should be involved in the establishment
of norms for network activities, yet state governments cannot and should
not attempt to expropriate all regulatory power from network communities.
In some ways, the European principle of subsidiarity 6 fits the network
model. States can act to govern behavior on networks only when state com-
petence and direct state interests are established or when they are more
capable of doing so than networks.
D. Role of the State
. Even though national borders have less meaning in an information soci-
ety, states retain a critical ability to influence rule-making by networks
themselves. States can provoke the creation of network standards like the
development of content filters on the CompuServe network.67 With power
over physical situs points (users and infrastructure), states have the
capability to set conditions of network operations, such as free expression
or minimal service obligations, in exchange for legally permissible access to
users or infrastructure situs points. States have a potent tool in the ability to
impose and enforce a certain degree of liability on networks and their par-
ticipants. This power thus gives states the capacity to influence network
behavior as well as the capacity to create legal conflicts.
See Hardy, supra note 29, at 1020.
64 See id. at 1025.
6 See text accompanying note 53.
6' See Michael Meyer, A Bad Dream Comes True in Cyberspace, NEwswEEK, Jan. 8, 1996, at 65.
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As the GIl moves forward, the governance of networks suggests a move-
ment toward a system of state-provided incentives through encouragement,
as well as allocation of liability, that will induce networks themselves to
adopt desirable public policies." For example, as stakeholders in a net-
work system, users may pressure networks to adopt principles of democracy
for network decisions, as seen mn the vigorous on-line debates regarding
CompuServe's action. However, under different circumstances, public inter-
ests may dictate that governments actively seek elements of network de-
mocracy as a condition of network operation. With physical power over
persons and infrastructure, states can exercise a control over key network
situs points. The allocation of liability might evolve as a policy instrument
to promote network self-regulation. Yet this policy instrument requires
cautious use. State intervention that imposes an excessive burden of liabili-
ty may impede the advantages of a robust network and result in censorship
of valuable information flows.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Gil poses a fundamental challenge to the conventional foundations of
governance. Global networks structurally alter regulatory decision-making.
National borders and sectoral boundaries lose an important degree of rele-
vance while network borders and network communities gain prominence.
Basic regulatory policymaking, whether under the anti-statist American ap-
proach or the comprehensive European approach, is ill suited to the GIl. In-
stead, a new "network governance paradigm" must emerge to recognize the
complexity of regulatory power centers, utilize new policy instruments such
as technical standardization to achieve regulatory objectives, accord status
to networks as semi-sovereign entities, and shift the role of the state toward
the creation of an incentive structure for network self-regulation.
" Professor Hardy makes a similar point in arguing for strict liability of network operators as the
best means of achieving a desired regulatory policy outcome. See Hardy, supra note 29, at 1041-48. This
runs the risk, however, that network operators will adopt a policy of "when in doubt, take it out" and con-
sequently engage in broad censorship.
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